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CASE NOTES

School desegregation cases are necessarily complicated, each case
presenting a wide variation of facts and problems to be solved. The
Supreme Court by granting the lower courts "broad remedial powers"
hoped to overcome the problem of varying local conditions. In Texas
III the court used its "broad equitable powers" to require the Texas
Education Agency to prepare a "statewide" plan subject to the court's
approval for the elimination of the dual school system.
"It is hoped that the full implementation of the Order in this case
and its consistent enforcement through the years will result in an end
to Federal intrusion into what should rightfully be a State function
....,,39
Only time will reveal whether this will prove to be true, or
whether it is simply another step to further federal intervention.
David B. Lobingier

CLASS ACTIONS-FRAuD--REcISSION

OF INSTALLMENT CONTRACTS

-A

GROUP OF CONSUMERS WHO HAVE BOUGHT MERCHANDISE UNDER
INSTALLMENT CONTRACTS MAY MAINTAIN A CLASS ACTION SEEKING
RESCISSION OF THE CONTRACTS FOR FRAUDULENT MISREPRESENTATIONS ON BEHALF OF THEMSELVES AND OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED.

Vasquez v. Superior Court of San Joaquin County, 484 P.2d 964 (Cal.
1971).
Approximately two hundred persons purchased freezers and frozen
food from Bay Area Company under installment contracts which
later were assigned to defendant finance companies. Thirty-seven
of these consumers, on behalf of themselves as well as the others, alleged
that they were induced to enter into the contracts by fraudulent
misrepresentations, and that the same misrepresentations were made to
each plaintiff by Bay Area's salesmen who memorized a standard statement and recited it by rote to each of them. A class action was attempted for rescission of the contracts based on fraud.1 The trial court
sustained defendants' demurrers insofar as the complaint alleged a
class action for fraud. Plaintiffs sought a writ of mandate to compel
the trial court to vacate its order sustaining the demurrers and order
the court to allow them to proceed to try the cause of action for fraud
89 United States v. Texas, 321 F. Supp. 1043, 1058 (E.D. Tex. 1970).
1 Vasquez v. Superior Court of San Joaquin County.,
484 P.2d 964 (Cal. 1971). Plaintiffs
also sought return of the amounts they had paid on the contracts, less the value of the
food they had consumed, plus damages for injury to their credit rating, storage fees for
the unused freezers, and punitive damages. The court did not discuss these allegations,
however, and considered only the prayer for rescission of the contracts in its decision.
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as a class. Held-Writ granted.2 A group of consumers who have bought
merchandise under installment contracts may maintain a class action
seeking rescission of the contracts for fraudulent misrepresentations
on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated.
The basis for class actions (also called class suits and representative
suits) can be found in equity's willingness to "interfere and take cog8
nizance of a matter in order to prevent a multiplicity of suits ....
To avoid a multiplicity of suits, equity required the joinder of all
those whose rights would be adjudicated.4 However, cases arose in
which the number of parties would make joinder impracticable.5 In
these cases the policy of avoiding multiple suits was all the more applicable since the greater number of parties would necessitate even
more suits. So, an exception (which later became known as a class
suit), was developed to the compulsory joinder rule.6 The rule of compulsory joinder "was dispensed with where it was inconvenient, difficult
or impracticable, on account of the number or situation of the parties,
to unite them in one suit. ' 7 In such circumstances the class suit allowed

one or more to sue or defend for the benefit of all. 8 These equitable
proceedings have been incorporated into various codes of civil procedure.9
The extent to which, and the circumstances under which, a class
action will be allowed is the subject of much controversy. 10 Some
cases have limited class actions to those instances where joinder would
have been proper, but was made impracticable by the number of potential parties." In some codes the provisions for class actions have been
2Id. The court found that a writ of mandate was the appropriate remedy rather than
an appeal since appeal may only be taken from a final judgment which disposes of all the
causes of action, and here the trial court overruled defendants' demurrers to a second
cause of action. The court also found, in the way of dictum, that under the allegations
of the complaint the defendant finance companies would not be entitled to payment as
holders in due course, and that the limitations on a buyer's rights set forth in § 1804.2 of
the California Civil Code would not apply in this case.
a 1 J, POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 244 (5th ed. 1941).
46 STAN. L. Rav. 120, 121 (1953).
5 Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 41, 61 S. Ct. 115, 118, 85 L. Ed. 22, 27 (1940). See Eisen
v. Carlisle, 391 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1968) (allowing class action on behalf of 3,750,000 people).
6 6 STAN. L. REv. 120, 121 (1953).
7 Newcomb v. Horton, 18 Wis. 594, 596 (1864).

8 Id.
9 E.g., CAL. CODE CIV. PROc. ANN. § 382 (Deering 1959):

Of the parties to the action, those who are united in interest must be joined as plaintiffs or defendants; but if the consent of any one who should have been joined as a
plaintiff cannot be obtained, he may be made a defendant, the reason thereof being
stated in the complaint; and when the question is one of a common or general
interest, of many persons, or when the parties are numerous, and it is impracticable
to bring them all before the court, one or more may sue or defend for the benefit of
all.
See also Heffernan v. Bennet & Armour, 243 P.2d 846 (Cal. Ct. App. 1952). The provisions
of the California code are typical.
101 J. POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 244 (5th ed. 1941).
11 Brenner v. Title Guarantee & Trust Co., 11 N.E.2d 890, 892 (N.Y. 1937).
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included in the rule for compulsory joinder, which led to the holding
that the members of the class must have been necessary parties within
that rule before a class action could be maintained.' 2 It has been held
that this interpretation is too restrictive.' 3 In order to maintain a class
and
action there must be: (1) the existence of an ascertainable class,
14
fact.
and
law
of
question
(2) a community of interest in the
The requirement of establishing the existence of an ascertainable
class does not necessitate identifying each individual class member
before a class action can be brought. 15 Rather, it appears to require
that the members of the class are capable of being made certain or
proven. Moreover, this requirement is not completely separable from
the second requirement since the existence of "an ascertainable class
depends in turn upon the community of interest . . . in the questions
of law and fact involved."' 1 Thus, the crucial consideration came to be
whether there was in fact such a community of interest.
In many cases the community of interest requirement was met when
the claims resulted from the same unauthorized, unlawful or illegal
act." However, this unity has not always been controlling or essential,
and class actions have been allowed where the claims arose from
separate transactions occuring at different times.' 8 Early cases required
a common fund or property. 19 A community of interest in a fund or
property was thought to mean a common right or title.20 Later it was
said that a common fund is not a requirement. 21 Instead, a community
of interest in the questions of law and fact apparently means that each
plaintiff's claim, and consequently the defendant's liability, would depend upon the resolution of the same questions. 22 If each person's right
to recover is based 2on questions which are distinct, a class action cannot be maintained. 8
12 Carey v. Brown, 58 Cal. 180, 184 (1881).
18 Darr v. Yellow Cab Co., 433 P.2d 732, 741 (Cal. 1967); Weaver v. Pasadena Tournament of Roses, 198 P.2d 514, 518 (Cal. 1948).
14 Daar v. Yellow Cab Co., 433 P.2d 732, 741 (Cal. 1967); Slakey Brothers Sacramento, Inc.
v. Parker, 71 Cal. Rptr. 269, 271 (Ct. App. 1968). See also 1 J. POMEROY, EQUITY JumisPRUDENCE § 269a (5th ed. 1941).

15 Daar v. Yellow Cab Co., 433 P.2d 732, 740 (Cal. 1967).
16 Id.
17 1 J. POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 269 (5th ed. 1941).
18 Id.

19 Watson v. Santa Carmelita Mutual Water Co., 137 P.2d 757, 762 (Cal. Ct. App. 1943).
20 Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Garrison, 32 So. 996, 997 (Miss. 1902).
21 Daar v. Yellow Cab Co., 433 P.2d 732 (Cal. 1967); Slakey Brothers Sacramento, Inc. v.

Parker, 71 Cal. Rptr. 269, 271 (Ct. App. 1968). But see Hall v. Coburn Corp. of America,
259 N.E.2d 720, 722 (N.Y. 1971). "The real sanction accorded by this court to class suits
has been in the dosely associated relationships growing out of trust, partnership or joint
venture, and ownership of corporate stock."

22 See Fanucchi v. Coberly.West Co., 311 P.2d 33 (Cal. Ct. App. 1957) (finding the
requisite community of interest where, "The basic facts necessary to establish liability on
the part of the defendants were all exactly the same with respect to each grower [plaintiff] ...
28 Daar v. Yellow Cab Co., 433 P.2d 732, 741 (Cal. 1967); Slakey Brothers Sacramento,
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This difficulty in arriving at a community of interest among all
class members has led to a reluctance of courts to permit class actions
based on fraud or misrepresentation. In order to recover for fraud one
must show that the defendant knowingly made false representations
intending that plaintiff be induced through reliance thereon to enter
the contract, and that plaintiff reasonably relied on the misrepresentations. 24 The peculiarities of each plaintiff's circumstances did not meet
of a community of interest in the questions of law
the requirement
25
and fact.
However, in Vasquez v. Superior Court of San Joaquin County, the
Supreme Court of California found that the plaintiffs had met the
requirements of an ascertainable class and community of interest and
held that a class action could be maintained based on fraud.26 The
court had little difficulty finding that there was an ascertainable class.
In doing so, the court relied upon the reasoning that if the members of
the class were within defendant's knowledge and could be identified
from his books or records, an ascertainable class existed. In Vasquez
this requirement was met since27the names of each class member could
be found in defendants' books.
However, the real difficulty encountered in attempting a class action
for fraud was in showing a community of interest in the questions of
law and fact. The problem was thought to be that it could not be
shown without individual proof that the same false representations
were made to, and relied on by each member of the class.
...the case of each person who has been deceived by a misrepreto himself, and must depend upon its own
sentation is peculiar
28
circumstances.
If this were true, there could not be a class action for fraud since there
would not be a community of interest. 29 However, in Vasquez it was
alleged that Bay Area's salesmen memorized a standard statement that
was recited by rote to each plaintiff. The court held that if this were
proven, an inference would arise that the same misrepresentations were
Inc. v. Parker, 71 Cal. Rptr. 269, 271 (Ct. App. 1968). "[Wihen each individual's right to
recover depends upon facts peculiar to his own case, the individuals cannot be brought
under the umbrella of a class action."
24 Ach v. Finkelstein, 70 Cal. Rptr. 472, 477 (Ct. App. 1968), cf. 12 S. WILISTON, CONTRACTS

§

1487 (3d ed. 1970); 1 H. BLACK, RESCISSION OF CONTRACTS AND CANCELLATION OF

WRrrrEN INSrTUMENTS § 24 (1916).

25 Hallows v. Fernie, L.R. 3 Ch. 467, 471 (1868).
26484 P.2d 964 (Cal. 1971).
27 Id. at 970.
28 Hallows v. Fernie, L.R. 3 Ch. 467, 471 (1868). But cf. Hightower v. Crawford, 36 So.
82, 83 (Miss. 1904). Although not dealing specifically with class actions, it was held that
where fifty-seven persons were allegedly induced by fraud to execute notes, all of the
plaintiffs' claims grew out of the same transaction and depended upon the same principles
of law.
29 Daar v. Yellow Cab Co., 433 P.2d 732, 741 (Cal. 1967).
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made to all. The court then went on to hold that the falsity of the
representations concerning the quality and value of the freezers made
to the named plaintiffs would show falsity as to all. 0 Thus, the existence
of the representations and their falsity would be amenable to proof
on a common basis, and these issues would not be peculiar to each
individual.
Similarly, the issue of reliance, one of the elements of fraud, was
also thought to be a stumbling block to class actions, since each individual would have to testify to his reliance on the misrepresentations.
The court was able to surmount this obstacle reasoning that reliance
may be inferred from the circumstances of the transactions and where
the misrepresentations were material, reliance may be inferred where
action is taken. 81 Thus, it was held that if material misrepresentations
were made to the class members, at least an inference of reliance would
arise as to the entire class.82 Therefore, this issue too could be determined on a common basis and it would be a common question within
the community of interest rule. 88
Finally, the court held that the fact that each member of the class
may be required to prove his individual damages did not preclude a
class action.8 4 Therefore, since the questions which must be tried
separately were not numerous or substantial in comparison with those
which may be tried jointly, it would be advantageous to the parties and
the court to allow a class action.
In reaching its decision the court cited the policy of protecting consumers from unfair practices. It found that a class action would
be an appropriate means of attaining that end since numerous consumers frequently are ".

.

. exposed to the same dubious practice

by the same seller so that proof of the prevalence of the practice as to
one consumer would provide proof for all. ' '8 5 If the earlier cases had

found, as this court did, that proof for one would provide proof for
all, then, presumably, they would have had little difficulty allowing
the maintenance of a class action. Seemingly, the biggest objection to
class actions for fraud was that the elements of fraud would have to
be proven on an individual basis. 88 This objection was overcome in the
instant case.
80 Vasquez v. Superior Court of San Joaquin County, 484 P.2d 964, 971 (Cal. 1971).
81 Id. at 972, citling 12 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACrS § 1515 (3d ed. 1970); Hunter v. McKenzie, 239 P. 1090, 1094 (Cal. 1925).
82 Vasquez v. Superior Court of San Joaquin County, 484 P.2d 964, 973 n.9 (Cal. 1971).
The court also found that reasonable reliance could be shown on a class basis. "If the
court finds that a reasonable man would have relied upon the alleged misrepresentations,
an inference of justifiable reliance by each class member would arise."
83 See Fanucchi v. Coberly-West Co., 311 P.2d 33 (Cal. Ct. App. 1957).
84 Vasquez v. Superior Court of San Joaquin County, 484 P.2d 964, 973 (Cal. 1971).
85 Id. at 968.
36 See Brenner v. Title Guarantee & Trust Co., 11 N.E.2d 890, 891 (N.Y. 1937); Hallows
v. Fernie, L.R. 3 Ch. 467, 471 (1868).
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However, there are other objections to a class suit based on fraud
that the court did not raise. One of these objections is that, "[t]he
law offers a choice of remedies to a person who has been induced to act
in reliance upon false representations." 87 Generally, there is a choice
between the remedies of: (1) Damages for being induced to enter the
contract, (2) rescission of the contract, or (3) enforcement of the contract as the person represented it to be.38 The problem is that the
choice of remedies is for each plaintiff individually.8 9 However, if the
class action proceeds to final judgment, it may be held to be res judicata
in subsequent actions by class members, and therefore binding upon
the absent parties. 40 Thus, if it is held to be res judicata, the absent
parties would not have the opportunity of choosing their remedy.
Following this reasoning, if the plaintiffs who actually brought the
action seek and are awarded rescission (and this disposition is later
held to be res judicata), the absent parties would have to be satisfied
with rescission regardless of their possible desire to seek damages or
enforcement of the contract as it was purported to be.
In the instant case the court did not speak about this objection.
However, the same court in Daarv. Yellow Cab Co. intimated that the
res judicata effect of the decree may be collaterally attacked by absent
parties, which would call for a closer scrutiny of the community of
interest among the parties. 41 It may further be inferred from Daar that
if the common questions are of sufficient importance to provide "substantial" benefits to the parties and the court, a judgment binding
on the absent parties may be justified.42 Thus, it would seem that the
plaintiffs would be allowed to proceed with their class action unless
and until one of the non-present parties objects to the choice of
remedies, at which time the class action could either be abandoned
entirely, or the objecting party would be allowed to withdraw his claim
from the action. As a practical matter, it is questionable whether a
consumer who learns that he has been fraudulently induced to pay for
something which he did not get would object to having his contract
rescinded, relieving him of the duty to continue paying for the item,
returning that which he had already paid, and offering him the possibility of receiving damages. Moreover, a contract induced by fraud
is not void, but merely voidable, and if nothing is done the contract
stands, fixing the rights and duties of the parties. 48 While the judg37 Brenner v. Title Guarantee & Trust Co., I1 N.E.2d 890, 891 (N.Y. 1937).
88 12 S. WLLISTON, CONTRACrS § 1523 (3d ed. 1970).
89 Brenner v. Title Guarantee & Trust Co., 11 N.E.2d 890, 891 (N.Y. 1937).

433 P.2d 732, 740, 745 (Cal. 1967).
Id. at 740.
Id. at 745.
48 12 S. WILUsroN, CoNrIRAcrs § 1526 (3d ed. 1970); accord, e.g., Associated Hardware
Supply Co. v. Big Wheel Distributing Co., 355 F.2d 114, 120 (Sd Cir. 1966) (contract in40
41
42
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ment rescinding the contracts may be binding on all class members
thereby rescinding all the contracts, it is doubtful that any finance
company would object if any of the consumers decided to stand by
his contract and continue paying the installments due.
A further objection to consumer class actions generally is that these
privately brought suits are not necessary because public agencies may
provide adequate protection. 4 However, the instant case found that
this is not true in this particular jurisdiction. The court noted that the
Attorney General supported the necessity of privately brought suits
because his office could not afford adequate protection to consumers.4 5
Protection of consumers by public agencies has generally proved to be
inadequate. 46 Furthermore, the court found support in a recent legislative enactment providing for consumer class actions under specified circumstances.

47

Just how far the decision of this case may be extended, and what
analogous situations may properly be the basis for class actions under
the holding of this case is not immediately ascertainable. In reaching
its decision the court stayed strictly within the factual situation presented. The court relied heavily on the allegation that the same exact
statements were made in the same manner to each plaintiff because
the statements were memorized and repeated by rote. Certainly there
are consumer products other than freezers, such as encyclopedias and
vacuum cleaners, that are sold to the public through the utilization
of the same technique employed by the Bay Area salesmen. Presumably, if fraudulent representations were made and relied on in those
situations, a class action would be available under the rationale of
this case. Perhaps television or billboard advertising may be held to
present different situations. In the instant case the false representations
were made by the seller's salesmen. The recitation of facts is silent on
the point, but it may be reasonable to infer that the representations were
made by the salesmen from whom the plaintiffs purchased the goods
and upon whom they relied at the time they entered the contract. In
the case of television advertisements, for example, generally the representations are not made by the salesman from whom the consumer purchases, nor at the time they purchase. Also, advertisements, depending
duced by fraud is voidable, not void); Milbank Mutual Insurance Co. v. Schmidt, 304 F.2d
640, 642 (8th Cir. 1962); Lloyd v. Williams, 38 Cal. Rptr. 849, 851 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1964).
44 Hall v. Coburn Corp. of America, 259 N.E.2d 720, 723 (N.Y. 1970).
45 Vasquez v. Superior Court of San Joaquin County, 484 P.2d 964, 974 n.14 (Cal. 1971).
46 See Eckhardt, Consumer Class Actions, 45 N.D.L. 663, 667 (1970) (author discusses
problems public agencies have in attempting to protect consumers, citing a case in which
it took the Federal Trade Commission twenty-nine years to bring a company to task for
deceptive practices).
47 Vasquez v. Superior Court of San Joaquin County, 484 P.2d 964, 975 (Cal. 1971).
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